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II. 
INTRODUCTION 
A thorough Statement of Facts has been previously set 
forth in Appellants' Opening and Reply Briefs and therefore will 
not be simply repeated herein. However, in relation to the 
petitioner's arguments for a rehearing as set forth below, a 
brief introduction is warranted. 
Renae, a secretary for Charles Brown at Brown, Smith & 
Hanna (BS&H) called Jim Luebcke at Progressive Printing for an 
estimate on a printing project for a client, Mr. Gary Davis 
(Davis) of William Cooper Winery. The quote given was for 
$500.00. At a later date, Mr. Luebcke met directly with Davis, 
who changed the order to a substantially different $4,000.00 
project. This was done without Charles Brown being present and 
without his knowledge. (Trans. 22, 52, 57) The trial court 
realizing this found that there was no contract or meeting of the 
minds between BS&H and the plaintiff after the original $500.00 
quote had turned into a substantially different $4,000.00 order 
by the client, Davis. (Trans. 74-75) 
Therefore, without the consent, authorization, 
knowledge, or contract (oral or written) of BS&H, Mr. Luebcke on 
his own, contacted Mr. Johnson of Alphagraphics and placed the 
$4,000.00 order so the majority of the work could be done by the 
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plaintiff over the weekend. Plaintiff realized at the time that 
BS&H was not liable for the order. It was very, very important 
to Mr. Johnson to meet with Charles Brown Monday morning to make 
BS&H responsible for the bill and not just the client. (Trans 67) 
To accomplish this, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Luebcke arranged a 
meeting with Jeffrey Brown (J. Brown) an attorney at BS&H on 
Monday, July 11, 1988. 
In this meeting J. Brown testified that he never stated 
that Charles Brown or that BS&H would be responsible for the 
order, but rather it was represented to him by plaintiff that 
Charles Brown had already agreed to pay for the printing costs. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that J. Brown stated that 
Charles Brown would be responsible. It was undisputed, however, 
that J. Brown never stated BS&H would be responsible for the 
printing. (Trans. 54) Therefore, the only party who could have 
been responsible for the order, after the Monday meeting with J. 
Brown, would have been Charles Brown. The tria
 t court, however, 
dismissed Charles Brown because there was no contract, i.e. 
meeting of the minds, for the $4,000.00 order (Trans. 74-75) and 
there was no authority on the part of J. Brown to orally bind 
Charles Brown to the order (Trans. 75-76). The trial court, 
however, failed to dismiss BS&H from the suit, although the 
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undisputed evidence is that J. Brown never stated that BS&H would 
be responsible. 
The trial court found rather that BS&H could be liable 
by implication based upon the statements of J. Brown that Charles 
would be responsible at the Monday meeting with the client, Mr. 
Guy Davis being present and agreeing to this. (Trans. 76) The 
court further ruled that while there had been some attempt by 
plaintiff to show a ratifying of the agreement by Charles Brown 
from conversations after the work was finished, there was no 
evidence of a retainer -although plaintiff indicated such in both 
opening and closing argument, and in no sense was this 
ratification of the contract. (Trans. 78). 
The trial court, at the end of trial, erroneously found 
that Guy Davis was present at this Monday meeting while the 
undisputed testimony shows Mr. Davis was not present at the 
Monday meeting (Trans. 25, 26, & 61) and the court found that 
conversations with Charles Brown was an acceptance or 
ratification of the contract, after finding earlier these 
conversations did not constitute any ratification. (Trans. 143-
144) 
On appeal, BS&H raised the argument that there could 
not be an express contract between BS&H and Alphagraphics, based 
upon the undisputed testimony presented at trial and furthermore, 
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that the trial court's findings upon which it based its decision 
against BS&H are clearly contrary to the evidence and the trial 
court's previous rulings and constitute reversible error, and 
should, therefore, be set aside. 
This court, however, affirmed the trial court's ruling, 
and judgment was entered on October 25, 1990. BS&H now 
respectfully submits to this court, pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the following points of law 
or fact which were overlooked or misapprehended in its review. 
Counsel for petitioner hereby certifies that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
III. 
POINTS OF LAW OR FACT 
OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
A. THERE WAS NEVER AN EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN 
THE PLAINTIFF, ALPHAGRAPHICS, AND BS&H. 
Although Renae of BS&H called Progressive Printing for 
an estimate of $500.00 for printing services, the trial court 
found that there was no contract, i.e. meeting of the minds 
between BS&H and plaintiff as to the $4,000.00 order, since Mr. 
Luebcke met directly with the client and the client substantially 
changed the order without the knowledge or consent of Charles 
Brown. (Trans. 73) The trial court however, stated that this may 
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be overcome by the authorization of an agent of Charles Brown. 
Plaintiff argued that the statement of J. Brown at the Monday 
meeting, that Charles would be responsible, was sufficient to 
bind Charles Brown to the order, but the trial court found no 
authority by J. Brown to orally bind Charles Brown to the order, 
Charles Brown was therefore dismissed from the suit. (Trans. 75) 
The trial court at this time should have also dismissed 
BS&H from the suit based upon the undisputed evidence and 
testimony on both sides that J. Brown never stated that BS&H 
would be responsible for the order. (Trans. 54) The trial court, 
however, failed to dismiss BS&H but stated, without any evidence 
being presented on the issue, that J. Brown had apparent 
authority to speak for BS&H and therefore could bind BS&H. In so 
holding, the trial court completely overlooked the undisputed 
testimony of both sides that J. Brown never did state that BS&H 
would be responsible for the order. Based upon the undisputed 
facts there is no contract or agreement that BS&H would be 
responsible for the order. Therefore there can be no express 
contract. To find an express contract the terms must be set 
forth in writing or express words. Bremerton Concrete Products 
Co. Inc. v. Mylles, 745 P.2d 1338 (Wash. App. 1987); Eaton v. 
Engelcke Manufacturing, Inc, 681 P.2d 1312 (Wash. App. 1984). 
The trail court itself, in its previous ruling found that there 
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was no express contract with BS&H, but states that one can be 
implied based upon the facts. (Trans. 77) However, as set forth 
below the trial court's implication of a contract between BS&H 
and plaintiff is based upon inconsistent and clearly erroneous 
findings of fact. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF AN IMPLIED 
CONTRACT IS CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
PREVIOUS RULINGS AND AGAINST THE CLEAR 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONSTITUTES 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In ruling against BS&H the trial court relies upon 
implication and states that, while J. Brown does not say BS&H 
will be responsible nevertheless, at his instigation, these 
individuals all meet in his office, with .the client, Mr. Guy 
Davis being present, with no testimony of any response from him 
as to my company will be responsible or I will be responsible, 
rather J. Brown responds by saying Charlie is responsible, the 
things which he says, while not express, implies that the law 
firm is going to be responsible. (Trans. 76-77) It was based 
upon these facts that BS&H was not properly dismissed from the 
suit. At the end of the trial, the trial court found the law 
firm liable by their actions, "by the implications, and by their 
response after the merchandise was delivered..." (Trans. 144). 
On appeal BS&H argued that the trial court's findings cannot 
stand under the clearly erroneous standard based upon the clear 
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weight of the evidence. The Appellants now submit that the 
following facts were overlooked by the appellate court in 
affirming the lower court's ruling. 
1. Guy Davis was not present at the Monday meeting on 
July 11, 1990. The trial court based its finding of an implied 
contract on the erroneous fact that Guy Davis was present at the 
July 11, 1988 Monday meeting. The court reasoned "there's no 
question but what in the meeting on Monday morning, he approves 
with Mr. Davis, the nature of the work to be done." (Trans. 75) 
the court went on further to reason "when the question is asked 
who will be responsible with the client present Mr. Guy Davis 
being present, and no testimony of any response from him as to my 
company will be responsible or I will be responsible, rather Mr. 
Jeffrey Brown responds by saying 'Charlie isf... that response 
the court feels, certainly would give the plaintiff's reason to 
believe that the corporation is also responsible is this matter." 
(Trans. 76-77) 
Contrary to the court's finding and reasoning Guy Davis 
was not present in the Monday morning meeting. (Trans. 25, 26 & 
61). Plaintiff, himself, admits that the court made a mistake in 
finding the client present in the Monday meeting. (See Brief of 
Appellee p. 18). Plaintiff goes on to argue that this 
constituted harmless error, but based upon the court's reasoning, 
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it is clear that the court based its decision on this erroneous 
finding, and in its absence there is a reasonable likelihood that 
a more favorable result would have been obtained for defendant. 
Therefore, this error is not harmless error, but constitutes 
r e v e r sibie error. Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 
(Utah 1983) This finding is also clearly erroneous and against 
the clear weight of the evidence and must be set aside. Hardy v. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989); Monrock, Inc. v. Sidwell, 
770 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1989); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. The trial court previously ruled that there was no 
ratification of a contract and no evidence or testimony of a 
retainer being paid to cover the printing. The trial court bases 
its decision against BS&H upon the alleged discussion with 
Charles Brown saying "well, we'll see if we can get some more 
money, we weren't given a big enough retainer, et cetera. (Trans. 
144) This is after the court previously ruled "that there was no 
testimony that the monies were to be paid out of a retainer fee." 
(Trans. 78) The court also ruled that there was no ratification 
and that Charles Brown if he did attempt to get sufficient money 
from his client, was acting only as a conduit to the client and 
his actions did not constitute ratification. (Trans. 78) The 
courtf s finding that there was a retainer paid to cover the 
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printing and that there was an acceptance or ratification of a 
contract by the defendants' actions after the merchandise was 
delivered are contrary to the court's earlier ruling and are 
against the clear weight of the evidence. It constitutes 
reversible error, in that it erroneously implies that BS&H was 
responsible for the work and directing the printing of the 
material on behalf of the client and in its absence it is 
reasonable that defendants would have obtained a more favorable 
ruling form the trial court• Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 
supra. 
3. The Monday meeting was not instigated at J. Brown's 
request but by the plaintiff. Another fact the trail court bases 
its decision on is the erroneous fact that BS&H requested the 
Monday morning meeting to meet with the plaintiff again with the 
client present. The court states, "while he does not expressly 
say Brown, Smith and Hanna will be responsible, nevertheless, at 
his instigation, these individuals all met in his office." 
(Trans. 76) 
The evidence is clear however, that it was the 
plaintiff who, realizing he had no agreement for the printing 
costs with BS&H after spending all weekend on the order, called 
Monday morning to set up a meeting with BS&H, to try and get BS&H 
responsible for the order. (Trans. 61-62) This fact was totally 
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overlooked by the trial court and if the trial court would have 
realized this fact it would have lent support to J- Brown's 
testimony that it was represented to him by the plaintiff that 
Charles Brown had already agreed to pay for the order. 
The above erroneous findings taken separately each 
constitutes reversible error. When they are considered together, 
it is clear that the trial court committed reversible error, 
requiring the reversal of the trial court's decision. 
C. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 
WHERE ADMITTED ERRORS HAVE BEEN MADE, 
CREATING AN ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE 
ERRORS ARE REVERSIBLE ERRORS OR NOT. 
Recovery for attorney's fees under Rule 33 is provided 
for when the appeal is frivolous or for delay. A frivolous 
appeal is one without reasonable or factual basis as defined in 
Rule 40(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals Backstrom 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable legal or 
factual basis. Maughan v. Maughan, 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. 44 (Ct. 
App. 1989). Under Rule 40(a) an appeal is not frivolous if there 
can be made a good faith argument for the appeal. This standard 
is clearly met in this case. 
Good faith arguments can and have been made for a 
reversal of the lower court's decision in this case. The record 
is clear that errors have been made by the trial -ruirt. In fact, 
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plaintiff admits that the trial court erred in its finding that 
Guy Davis was present at the Monday meeting. (See Appellee's 
Brief p. 18) Although, plaintiff claims that this error was 
harmless error, whether the error is harmless or not, is a matter 
of determination on appeal. A good faith argument can be made 
that it was not harmless error, when the trial court actually 
states that it found against BS&H based upon this erroneous 
finding. To award attorney's fees in such a case is too extreme 
and will unjustly chill the appeal process. This court, itself 
held that sanctions for bringing a frivolous appeal "should only 
be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling 
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Poco v. 
Poco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). 
Furthermore, the case at bar is not similar to other 
cases where the appeal has been found to be frivolous. In Barker 
v. Emporium Partnership, 750 P. 2d 202 (Utah 1988) the defendants 
failed to timely appeal the issues argued and thus the appeal was 
found to be solely for delay. Id. at 203. In State v. Walker, 
752 P. 2d 369 (Utah Ct. App 1988) the appellant failed to follow 
proper procedure in filing the docketing statement. The appeal 
wasn't dismissed, but attorneys fees were awarded. In Backstrom 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, supra, the appeal was not taken 
from a properly certified order, was not taken from an order that 
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wholly disposed of the claim or party, but was one in a series of 
many actions designed to postpone collection of a debt and 
careful consideration under Rule 40(a) would have revealed these 
defects. In the case at bar, however, whether the errors 
committed are harmless or reversible cannot be decided so simply. 
In awarding attorney's fees in this case, the court is unjustly 
chilling the appeal process. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no express contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant on the $4,000.00 order, as a matter of law, as 
previously ruled by the trial court. 
The trial court's finding of an implied contract is 
based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous and must 
be overturned. Furthermore, in absence of these erroneous 
findings, there is a reasonable likelihood that defendants would 
have had a more favorable result, therefore, the trial courts' 
errors constitutes reversible error. 
Finally, regardless of the outcome, plaintiff should 
not be awarded attorney's fees in this case, as this is not a 
frivolous appeal. Based upon the record and ^imission of 
plaintiff it is clear that errors have been made by the trial 
court in this case. Attorney's fees should not be awarded where 
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errors have been made and the issue is whether the errors are 
reversible or not. 
DATED this ^> day of November, 1990. 
Budge W. Call 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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